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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






JOSEPH CLIFFORD MALCOMB, 




CRAIG MCKEAN, Pennsylvania State Police;  
JOSHUA THOMAS, Pennsylvania State Police 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 11-cv-01087) 
District Judge:  Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 24, 2015 
 
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 







 Joseph Malcomb, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals a District 
Court order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  We will affirm. 
 As we write primarily for the parties, we need not recite at length the details of 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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this case.  On December 21, 2007, the defendants, who are two Pennsylvania State Police 
officers, executed a search of Malcomb’s residence pursuant to a warrant, which led to 
the discovery of certain pieces of property that were believed to be stolen.  Malcomb, 
who had recently had his parole revoked, was thereafter charged with offenses related to 
receiving stolen property.  In May 2009, however, the state trial court granted a motion to 
suppress the allegedly stolen goods, ruling that the officers had searched beyond the 
scope of the authorizing warrant, that the warrant was impermissibly general, and that the 
affidavit supporting the warrant failed to identify the source of its information.  The 
stolen property charges against Malcomb were dismissed pursuant to a grant of nolle 
prosequi in September 2009.   
 On August 14, 2011, Malcomb filed a complaint in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging constitutional and state-tort 
theories of false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
and illegal search and seizure.  The Magistrate Judge recommended that the complaint be 
dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because the majority of the claims 
were filed outside of the two-year statute of limitations period, and also because the one 
timely claim – for malicious prosecution – was defective.  In particular, the Magistrate 
Judge found that Malcomb could not establish that the criminal proceeding had been 
disposed of in his favor.  The District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation.  
Malcomb appealed and, with the assistance of appointed counsel, argued only that the 
District Court erred in dismissing Malcomb’s malicious prosecution claim for failure to 
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establish favorable termination.1  We held that the nolle prosequi disposition of the 
charges against Malcomb was a favorable termination, and remanded the matter to the 
District Court.  See Malcomb v. McKean, 535 F. App’x 184, 187 (3d Cir. 2013) (not 
precedential).    
 The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Magistrate Judge 
recommended granting.  The Magistrate Judge concluded that the malicious prosecution 
claim failed because there was probable cause to charge Malcomb with receiving stolen 
property, because the defendants did not act maliciously, because Malcomb did not suffer 
a deprivation of liberty, and because one of the defendants, Trooper Thomas, did not 
initiate the criminal proceedings against Malcomb.2  Over Malcomb’s objections, the 
District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation and dismissed the complaint 
with prejudice.  Malcomb appealed.    
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of an order granting 
summary judgment is plenary.  See Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 
2011).  Summary judgment is proper where, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-
                                              
1 Malcomb waived appeal of the remaining claims because he did not raise them in his 
brief.  See Laborers’ Int’l Union v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 
2 In the alternative, the Magistrate Judge stated that the defendants were entitled to 




23 (3d Cir. 2006).  We may affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on 
any basis supported by the record.  See Fairview Township v. EPA, 773 F.2d 517, 525 
n.15 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 In order to state a malicious prosecution claim, Malcomb must show that 1) the 
defendants initiated a criminal proceeding, 2) the proceeding ended in his favor, 3) the 
proceeding was initiated without probable cause, 4) the defendants acted maliciously or 
for a purpose other than bringing him to justice, and 5) he suffered a deprivation of 
liberty.  Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  In their motion 
for summary judgment, the defendants argued, inter alia, that Malcomb did not suffer a 
deprivation of liberty.  We agree.  The undisputed facts demonstrate that Malcomb was 
already in custody as a technical parole violator when he was charged with receiving 
stolen property.  According to the defendants, he was “never was arrested as a result of 
the search of his property, [the] seizure of the items located in his house, or the charges 
brought against him.”  Malcomb possibly was required to attend the suppression hearing, 
but his forced attendance does not constitute a deprivation of liberty for purposes of a 
malicious prosecution claim.  See DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 603 
(3d Cir. 2005) (stating that “[t]he type of constitutional injury the Fourth Amendment is 
intended to redress is the deprivation of liberty accompanying prosecution, not 
prosecution itself”).   Malcomb remained incarcerated for the technical parole violation 
until 2013.  During this period, he was denied re-parole several times.  Although he 
claims that his “parole eligibility was placed in limbo” because of the stolen property 
charges, the Parole Board’s decisions demonstrate that the denial of re-parole was based 
5 
 
on factors completely unrelated to the pending charges.  Therefore, there was no seizure 
as a result of the stolen property charges, Malcomb’s Fourth Amendment rights were not 
violated, and the District Court did not err in granting the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment on Malcomb’s malicious prosecution claim.    
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
 
